Varieties of Economic Crisis, Varieties of Ideational
Change: How and Why financial regulation and macroeconomic policy differ Andrew Baker One of the principal tasks facing post-crash academic political economy is to analyse patterns of ideational change and the conditions that produce such change. What has been missing from the existing literature on ideational change at times of crises however, is a sense of how processes of persuasive struggle, and how the success of those 'norm entrepreneurs' arguing for ideational change is shaped by two contextual variables: the most immediate material symptoms and problems that a crisis displays (the variety of crisis); and the institutional character of the policy subsystem that agents have to operate within to affect change. Introducing these two variables into our accounts of persuasive struggle and ideational change enables us to deepen our understanding of the dynamics of ideational change at times of crisis. The article identifies that a quite rapid and radical intellectual change has been evident in the field of financial regulation in the form of an embrace of a macroprudential frame. In contrast in the field of macroeconomic policy -both monetary and fiscal policy, many pre-crash beliefs remain prominent, there is evidence of ideational stickiness and inertia, and despite some policy experimentation, overarching policy frameworks and their rationales have not been overhauled. The article applies Peter Hall's framework of three orders of policy changes to help illuminate and explain the variation in patterns of change in the fields of financial regulation and macroeconomic policy since the financial crash of 2008. The different patterns of ideational change in macroeconomic policy and financial regulation in the post-crash period can be explained by timing and variety of crisis; sequencing of policy change; and institutional political differences between micro policy sub systems and macro policy systems.
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The historical experience of the great depression of the 1930s and the stagflation of the 1970s, has resulted in much political economy scholarship associating episodes of financial and economic crises with far reaching ideational change (Blyth, 2002 , Helleiner, 2010 , Hall, 1993 , Hay, 1996 , Gamble, 2009 . One important contribution draws attention to a process of 'persuasive struggle' between elites and mass publics that crises ignite, as agents compete for the right to define the nature of that crisis and how to respond by forwarding interpretations and arguments drawn from particular intellectual frames (Widamier, Seabrooke, 2007, Blyth, 2002) . What has been missing from the existing literature on ideational change at times of crises however, is a sense of how these processes of persuasive struggle, and how the success of those 'norm entrepreneurs' arguing for ideational change is shaped by two contextual variables: the most immediate material symptoms and problems that a crisis displays (the variety of crisis); and the institutional character of the policy subsystem that agents have to operate within to affect change. Introducing these two variables into our accounts of persuasive struggle and ideational change enables us to deepen our understanding of the dynamics of ideational change at times of crisis. This is important and relevant for our understanding of the political economy of the recent financial crash, because a quite rapid and radical intellectual change has been evident in the field of financial regulation in the form of an embrace of a macroprudential frame (Borio, 2009 , Baker 2013a , Goodhart, 2014 . In contrast in the field of macroeconomic policy -both monetary and fiscal policy, many pre-crash beliefs remain prominent, there is evidence of ideational stickiness and inertia, and despite some policy experimentation, overarching policy frameworks and their rationales have not as yet been overhauled (Farrell and Quiggin, 2012 , Blyth, 2013a Dellepiane Avellaneda, 2014 , Hodson and Mabbett, 2010 , Clift, 2014 .
In this respect, why some ideas change at times of crisis and in some policy areas but not in others, and why some ideas are successful in taking root in certain circumstances and not in others, are questions that require more attention in the field of political economy (Chwieroth, 2010) . This article addresses these questions by focusing on the context in which actors or 'norm entrepreneurs' arguing for change operate, and how that context effects their strategies and success. Norm entrepreneurs are individuals, usually with expert technical knowledge, who construct cognitive frameworks to give meaning to events such as economic crisis, and generally promote these frameworks and ideas out of a sense of genuine 'ideational commitment,' because they genuinely believe in a set of ideas, even if they have no immediate material impact on their own well-being (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p.897-898) , although this should not rule out the possibility that individuals can act in a more instrumental fashion and promote ideas that favour the institutions they represent.
The article applies Peter Hall's framework of three orders of policy changes to help illuminate and explain the variation in patterns of change in the fields of financial regulation and macroeconomic policy since the financial crash of 2008 (Hall, 1993) . First, applying
Hall's framework of three orders of change helps us to identify that radical intellectual change in financial regulation appears to proceed much more quickly than radical macroeconomic intellectual change. Second, it illustrates how the sequencing of ideational change is different in financial regulation than in macroeconomic policy. Third, it illuminates that experts and technocrats have more scope to affect radical intellectual change in financial regulation, but are more constrained in terms of detail and practical policy implementation, whereas the evidence points in the opposite direction in macroeconomic policy, with technocrats having more autonomy over the detail of policy, but less in setting broader intellectual frames. Ultimately, it is argued that both policy areas respond to different varieties of crises in different ways because of their contrasting political and institutional characteristics, with financial regulation likely to respond to dramatic, explosive banking crises, because it is easier for norm entrepreneurs to make a plausible case for regulatory change in such circumstances that will have intuitive appeal to a range of actors.
Macroeconomic policy is more likely to respond to slow burning crises of progressive macroeconomic underperformance, making profound intellectual change in macroeconomic policy a much slower long term process, as time is required for the case for change to be assembled and for it to become appealing to the plurality of actors required to make it politically viable. Ideational change is therefore not only mediated and shaped by institutional context (Bell, 2011), but norm entrepreneurs' capacity to promote ideational change is constrained by the material symptoms of crisis, which will shape the intuitive appeal of their arguments to a range of other actors (Widmaier, Blyth and Seabrooke, 2007) .
While the argument developed here does draw attention to different varieties of economic crisis and their symptoms, unlike accounts of varieties of economic crisis in the economics literature (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008,) we cannot afford to focus solely on the material economic manifestations and features of crisis alone. Rather a genuine political economy of crises has to examine the interactions between the material financial and 
Financial Regulation and Macroeconomic Policy on Divergent Policy Tracks?
One of the most intriguing and potentially illuminating statements made by a policy maker in the post 2008 crash era, was made by the Bank of England's former Deputy Governor, Paul
Tucker. In a 2011 speech, Tucker stated:
"we needed to think about markets somewhat differently when we are doing monetary policy and financial stability. For monetary policy in most circumstances, it is a reasonable default assumption that core markets are more or less efficient most of the time. So while we absolutely have to be alert to distortions, we are not crazy to infer from yield curves, expectations about the path of policy rates or of inflation. But for financial stability (regulation), which of course affects macroeconomic conditions, I have always encouraged the team to do a 'Gesltalt flip' to think of markets as inefficient, riddled with preferred habitats, imperfect information, regulatory arbitrage, herding and inhabited by agents with less than idealised rationality" (Tucker, 2011, pp.3-4) .
This statement is interesting and potentially illuminating because it indicates that central banks are characterised by a degree of intellectual pragmatism and that the ideational and institutional politics in the area of macroeconomic policy and financial regulation might be quite different.
It is now widely accepted in regulatory circles that over reliance on banks' Value at Risk (VaR) models that revolved around market prices and the subsequent monitoring of those models by supervisors, was one of the weaknesses of the pre-crash regulatory regime (Turner, 2011 , Persaud, 2009 , Brunnermeir at al 2009 , FSA, 2009 , FSF, 2009 , Panetta et al, 2009 , Youngman, 2009 , Goodhart, 2005 , Borio, Furfine and Low, 2001 . Market prices were assumed to be driven by the rational interaction of multiple independent agents and market risk was therefore mathematically modelable. These beliefs informed regulatory practice, as greater transparency, more disclosure and more effective risk management by financial firms based on market prices became the cornerstones for the regulation of supposedly efficient markets (Eatwell, 2009 , Turner, 2011 . All of this was largely justified by the arguments of new classical economists such as Robert Lucas, that if human beings are rational in their preferences, choices and expectations then the macroeconomy would have a strong tendency towards equilibrium (Lucas, 1980) , as well as Eugene Fama's efficient markets hypothesis that liquid financial markets were characterized by the efficient processing of all available information, making the actual price of a security a good estimation of its intrinsic value . In the words of the chair of the UK's Financial Services Authority, Lord Adair
Turner, in the pre-crash period, a simplified version of the efficient markets hypothesis became part of the regulatory 'institutional DNA' (Turner, 2011,) The financial collapse of 2007-8, as Tucker himself concedes, revealed that 'securities were fundamentally mispriced (Tucker, 2011, p. 3)' and that markets and the agents that constitute them do make ex ante mistakes ( p.2), questioning the claims of the 'rational expectations paradigm' that has dominated economics since the 1970s (Tucker, 2011, p.2) . Armed with efficient markets assumptions, supervisors, in the pre-crash period, focused on assessing and evaluating the risk management models and procedures of individual banks (Tsingou, 2008) . Since the crash and in recognition that financial markets are prone to procyclicality, that herding is common behaviour, and that financial complexity and innovation can engender inherent financial instability, regulators throughout the world are now seeking to build macroprudential regulatory regimes based on macro level countercyclical interventions intended to limit systemic risk and endogenous financial instability, in a significant and intellectually radical macroprudential ideational shift (Baker, 2013a , Baker and Widmaier, 2014 If we revisit the justification for the current monetary policy framework in the UK, introduced in 1997 by the New Labour government, to give operational independence to the Bank of England to set interest rates to meet a pre defined inflation target, it revolved around the need to achieve credibility through 'pre commitment,' maximum transparency and constrained discretion by facing down 'time inconsistency ' (Balls, 1998) . In other words, the framework was justified by the need to signal 'good future intentions' to rational economic agents. Moreover, reaching judgements on what may happen to inflation requires a degree of formal modelling and forecasting that requires an assumption that agents will respond rationally to future price signals. In this sense, the assumption in monetary policy has served the Bank of England and other central banks rather well. However, when we contrast this with the position the Bank adopts in financial regulation, it would also appear to be a convenient and pragmatic fiction. In this sense, the first assumption outlined by Tucker, provided the justification for expanding the Bank's powers to set interest rates and to target a pre assigned measure of inflation. It is therefore easy to see why the Bank continues to be wedded to such assumptions in the field of monetary policy, because it is central to its pivotal role in monetary policy making. For example, only in the first half of 2014 has Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney begun to openly question the UK's inflation targeting regime as a potential distraction, some five and half years on from the peak of the financial distress that shook the prior efficient markets orthodoxy, suggesting there has been resistance to learning in the field of monetary policy and that this process has proceeded very slowly (Carney, 2014 (Tucker, 2011, p. 4) . Therefore while central banks have had institutional incentives to challenge efficient market thinking in the field of financial regulatory policy, they also have institutional incentives to favour inertia in the field of monetary policy. While this is a clear and attractive explanation for the different patterns of post-crash ideational change in macroeconomic and financial regulatory policy, it is also a partial and simplistic one, because central banks do not determine policy outcomes in either field in isolation and have little input into fiscal policy, which also appears to have displayed some intellectual continuity being guided by notions of crowding out, Ricardian equivalence and the expansionary potential of fiscal contraction (Blyth, 2013) .
The UK's Macroeconomic Paradigm Shift in the 1970s
Peter Hall's work on British macroeconomic policy highlighted a number of features that potentially tell us a great deal about the institutional and policy dynamics of macroeconomic policy change (Hall, 1993) . Hall distinguished between three orders of policy change: the ideas and assumptions that inform and set the overarching objectives of policy in a given area (third order change): the institutional arrangements and instruments used to achieve those objectives (second order change): and the precise settings of those instruments in quantitative or numerical terms (first order change) (Hall, 1993) . Hall used the notion of third order change to denote radical change in the overarching terms of policy discourse, in the hierarchy of goals behind policy (Hall, 1993, p.279 ) and in causal assumptions or accounts of how the world facing policy makers actually works (Hall, 1993, p.280) . He associated this kind of change with a Kuhnian 'paradigm shift' (Kuhn, 1996) . Thomas Kuhn of course, famously compared scientific paradigms to a Gestalt or an interpretative framework of terminology and assumptions, which are influential precisely because so much of them are taken for granted and resistant to scrutiny. From time to time, the policy and regulatory process Hall argued, is characterized by a shift from one policy frame to another, -third order change. Kuhn referred to this process of moving from one paradigm to another as a 'Gestalt flip', when underlying assumptions about aspects of the world are overturned and replaced with a different, or diametrically opposed set of assumptions about how things are actually constituted, as in Paul
Tucker's use of the term to distinguish the differing assumptions the Bank of England adopts in monetary policy and financial regulation.
Hall developed the idea of third order change based on an examination of the shift from Keynesian to Monetarist macroeconomic policy making in Britain during the 1970s. While macroeconomic policy in Britain was occasionally at least partially pragmatically Keynesian in outlook since 1979, Tomlinson, 2007, Oliver and Pemberton, 2004) , as Oliver and Pemberton note, this overlooks that there was a basic trajectory change in British macroeconomic policy and UK political economy more generally, that was driven in part by a change in dominant economic ideas, heralding three decades of market oriented neoliberalism (Oliver and Pemberton, 2004) . For former British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson, under the Keynesian frame the objective of macroeconomic policy was to generate growth through stimulus and fiscal expansion, while the objective of microeconomic policy was to contain inflation through incomes policy. Under the Thatcher governments these roles were reversed. Microeconomic policy was used to generate growth through structural reform, privatisation, labour and financial market deregulation and the removal of red tape, allowing business and entrepreneurs as 'supply side heroes,' to expand and become more profitable, in accordance with Say's Law that supply generates its own demand. In contrast after 1979 macroeconomic policy concentrated on stabilising inflation, rather than on growth and reducing unemployment (Lawson, 1992) .
In Hall's analysis the shift from Keynesian policy in Britain was characterised by three very specific features. These are time or duration, sequencing and political and institutional context. These variables are laid out in table 1.
Time: A slow burning crisis of stagnation First, relating to time or temporal dynamics the shift was a protracted process played out over six years from 1973 to 1979. The Keynesian paradigm according to Hall was characterised by the progressive accumulation of anomalies from 1973 onwards (Hall, 1993) . This was most notable in the occurrence of stagflation, -a simultaneous increase in inflation and unemployment, -a phenomenon that was not fully comprehensible within the terms of the existing paradigm, and in Hall's terms, appeared to 'vitiate the Phillips curve' (Hall, 1993, p.285) . However, wholesale third order change and the formal abandonment of Keynesian objectives, only transpired some six years later following the election of Margaret Thatcher in burning long term economic crisis of stagnation, persistent lack of growth and progressively rising inflation, as increments of Keynesian reflation appeared to become progressively less effective, resulting in a number of policy mistakes that appeared to make the situation worse, 'stretching the intellectual coherence of the existing paradigm to the point of breaking' (Hall, 1993, p.285) . Balance of payments problems, rapid inflation, mounting external debt, poor government finances, repeated pressure on Sterling and growing trade union unrest all combined. These problems were eventually constructed as a crisis of an 'overloaded' and oversized state, of the excess power of organised labour, of rising prices and wages, and ultimately of an exhausted prevailing macroeconomic model (Hay, 1996 .) Monetarism provided an intellectually coherent and politically appealing critique of the status quo to factions within the Conservative party, as Keynesian policy makers at the Treasury gradually lost their authority and credibility on economic policy to an outside market place of economic ideas (Hall, 1993, p.286) . However, this process itself took several years, as social learning proceeded slowly, reflecting the slow burning nature of economic stagnation and persistent inflation, the need to interpret these problems and to build political coalitions to support such an interpretation. One potential hypothesis that comes out of Hall's work on macroeconomic policy therefore, is that far reaching macroeconomic ideational change is likely to be a relatively long term process and is most likely to be catalysed by a long running, slow burning crisis of persistent poor macroeconomic performance. Such crises are often complex, involving several interrelated features such as rising inflation, economic stagnation and poor growth, balance of payments problems and rising budget deficits as in the 1970s case.
Making the causal connections, working out a narrative and advancing a series of coherent prescriptions and a policy framework to address such a complex range of problems can therefore take several years. Moreover, such a case for change will require recognisable empirical evidence of persistent long running problems over several years if the case for far reaching macroeconomic change is to become persuasive to a critical mass of actors.
Policy Sequencing
Second, Hall's analysis suggested that sequencing and prior policy experimentation is a precondition for far reaching macroeconomic third order change. In the period, from [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] , successive UK governments experimented in the form of first and second order changes, before new third order objectives were formally embraced by the Thatcher government in 1979. Some of these policies, such as the new system for controlling public expenditure -'cash limits' and the removal of quantitative controls on lending in the financial system, had a distinctly non-Keynesian orientation (Hall, 1993, p.278 
Institutional and Political Context
Third, Hall drew attention to the political nature of the paradigm shift and how it was influenced by the institutional context for the conduct of macroeconomic policy, arguing that third order change was 'more sociological than scientific,' involving a set of society wide judgments more political in tone. In particular, third order macroeconomic change required politicians reaching a judgment on which group of experts to regard as 'authoritative' (Hall, 1993, p.280 (Hall, 1993, pp.286-287) . In contrast, the development of first and second order changes to particular macroeconomic instruments, and their quantitative settings, in the prior 1+2 phase of experimentation were much more technical matters. They were, Hall notes, carried out almost exclusively by technocrats and civil servants with little input from politicians, or wider political actors (Hall, 1993, p.281 ).
This suggests that the detail of macroeconomic policy tends to be less politically contentious than a formal announcement of changes in underlying assumptions, overarching objectives and a corresponding redesign in policy frameworks.
Notably, macroeconomic policy is always a central plank of any aspiring governing party's programme to govern and a key part of its communications with the electorate.
Approval of third order change in this area, in turn requires widespread political support and understanding. In most countries macroeconomic policy resembles what James Thurber has referred to as a macropolicy system, -general policy decisions with major political effects involving broad public interests, visibility, divisiveness, high media coverage and many participants (Thurber, 1996 p.77.) In such policy systems consensus building in favour of far reaching change tends to be a slow process due to the sheer number of actors that have to be convinced and the fact third order macroeconomic change appears to depend on electoral campaigning calculations and cycles. 
The Macroprudential Third Order Ideational Shift of 2009
It is now widely acknowledged by academics and policy makers that a macroprudential ideational shift emerged from the financial crash of 2008 (Borio, 2009 , Baker, 2013a , Persaud, 2010 , Haldane, 2009 , Datz, 2013 , Goodhart, 2014 , Hanson, Kyap and Stein, 2011 denying that individually rational self-interested investment strategies are likely to produce financial stability and equilibrium, identifying finance's inherent procyclical tendencies, the propensity for herd behaviour amongst investors and the destabilising effects of financial complexity (Borio, 2009 , Baker, 2013b . The macroprudential ideational shift through its assumptions about the behaviour and properties of financial markets, justifies a regulator intervening with countercyclical policy measures to restrain and direct market activities on a system wide basis. Macroprudential policy involves using prudential measures (a variety of capital requirements, both price based and quantity based instruments) for macroeconomic ends, or seeking to protect the real economy from financial excess and instability (Haldane, 2014a (Haldane, , 2013 2 ).
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Viewed in terms of Hall's criteria, the adoption of macroprudential regulatory objectives, assumptions and language can be seen as an example of third order change.
According to Hall's criteria, third order change requires a radical change in the overarching terms of policy discourse, in the hierarchy of goals behind policy and in causal assumptions or accounts of how the world facing policy makers actually works. The macroprudential shift fits all three of these criteria. First, Hall points out that policy makers work within a framework of ideas and standards that specify the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing. Like a Gestalt, this framework is embedded in the very terminology through which policy makers communicate about their work (Hall, 1993, p.279.) In the world of financial regulation, macroprudential is the new Gestalt. As Claudio Borio of the BIS, has astutely observed of his regulatory peers, they are 'all macroprudentialists now,' at least in Research Network (MaRS) to develop core conceptual frameworks, models and tools in order to improve macroprudential supervision and research, including over 180 researchers from the ECB and EU national central banks, and academic economists from Europe and the United States. In this sense, in Vivien Schmidt's terms, 'macroprudential' can be conceived of as a 'co-ordinative' discourse that organises experts, through a 'programme', that sets the underlying organising principles and frames of reference that define the problems to be solved by policies, the issues to be considered, the goals to be achieved, the norms, methods and instruments to be applied (Schmidt, 2008) .
Second, there has been a movement from a microprudential approach focused solely on evaluating the safety of individual institutions and their VaR models, to viewing risk as a systemic and endogenous property requiring system wide regulatory policy instruments and interventions to constrain and steer private risk taking and investment strategies as part of new macro stabilisation efforts to protect the wider economy from the excesses of the financial sector. Moreover, its stronger advocates have suggested the real social purpose of macroprudential regulation is to make finance more socially useful, better serving the real economy, so that finance becomes the 'servant rather than the master' (Haldane, 2012 Turner, 2011 , Lothian, 2011 . There is therefore scope for representing the emergence of macroprudential regulation as a substantial change in the hierarchy of policy goals from micro-supervision to macro-level systemic intervention, stabilisation, management and direction. Third, macroprudential's assumptions about endogenous and endemic financial instability, draw heavily on the ideas of Hyman Minsky, representing a radically different position from the Eugene Fama inspired pre-crash efficient markets position (Baker, 2013a , Turner, 2011 , Barwell, 2013 . As Paul Tucker's statement, discussed earlier in this paper indicates, the movement from assuming that financial markets will produce stable efficient outcomes, to recognising their propensity to generate instability and negative societal wide externalities, changes the foundational assumptions at the core of financial regulation, and represents a 'Gestalt flip' from the prior efficient markets orthodoxy, a process Hall himself associates with third order change (Hall, 1993) .
The implication of this is that the macroprudential ideational shift has switched the cognitive filter employed by policy makers to a quite different setting. Policy makers are now 18 using various macroprudential rationales to inform and guide regulatory initiatives and practice. The effect of this change is to bring a whole range of practical policy instruments within reach, which were previously cursorily dismissed and not even seriously debated or considered as a consequence of the dominance of the efficient markets perspective (Baker, 2013 ). These include: countercyclical capital requirements; dynamic loan loss provisioning; countercyclical liquidity requirements; administrative caps on aggregate lending; reserve requirements; limits on leverage in asset purchases; loan to value ratios for mortgages; loan to income ratios; minimum margins on secured lending; transaction taxes; constraints on currency mismatches; capital controls; and host country regulation (Elliot, 2011) . Possibly, the most intriguing thing about the macroprudential ideational shift however, is that it can be seen to reverse every one of the three characteristics of the third order change in macroeconomic policy in the UK, identified by Hall (see table 1 the Horsham G20 communiqué was openly advocating counter cyclical capital buffers and policies designed to 'mitigate the procyclicality' of the financial system, while the London G20 summit communiqué called for the development of macroprudential regulation (G20, 2009a, 2009b) . In a period of little over six months, macroprudential ideas moved from relative obscurity in certain enclaves of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), to the centre of the policy agenda, dominating and driving the post crisis financial reform debate, in the international community of central bankers, (Borio, 2011 , Haldane, 2009 , Tucker, 2011 , Bernanke, 2011 , Constancio, 2011 , FSB/IMF/BIS, 2011, Baker 2013a).
The events of 2007-08 were dramatic as asset values collapsed, liquidity dried up, credit markets froze, interbank lending markets ground to a halt, several financial institutions became insolvent and many others required public financial support of various descriptions to continue trading. These dramatic events appeared to provide empirical disconfirmation of the efficient markets perspective, but they also created a sense of urgency for policy makers and politicians to be seen to be doing something in order to respond to rapidly unfolding events by taking affirmative action with a new policy programme, whose constituent concepts seemed to predict and provide a framework for explaining and accounting for financial instability (Persaud, 2010) . There was consequently an imperative and pressure to be seen to be taking action quickly. Notably, linking the symptoms of financial distress, malfunctioning banking systems and frozen inter-bank markets to the destabilising systemic dynamics of financial markets and the failure of existing approaches to financial regulation has an intuitive appeal. In contrast, linking the crisis to macroeconomic causes by highlighting global imbalances, the limits of a narrow focus on inflation, excessive inequality and or a broken growth model, are much more complex intellectual arguments that have to specify a longer and more elaborate causal chain, and have far less immediate intuitive mass appeal.
Not only do they take longer to work out, but the act of persuasion that has been agent based 20 constructivism's focus (Widmaier et al, 2007) , also becomes a longer and more time (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) .
Crucially, macroprudential ideas and arguments already had a key foothold in international central bank policy networks. Notably, some staff at the BIS (a source of analysis and banking services for central banks) had spent the early 2000s developing macroprudential foundational concepts such as procyclicality (Borio, Furfine and Lowe, 2001 , Borio, 2003 , Borio and White, 2004 , White, 2006 , BIS 2006 , Clement, 2010 At the same time, the Bank of England had an in-house financial stability team that had worked on macroprudential issues since 2004, but chose to avoid publicly discussing these matters, because of the prevailing climate of opinion, and a recognition there was little point in putting this analysis in play because there would not be much of an audience for it both within the Bank, but also outside, particularly in the United States. However, as explained by one Bank of England official, "this meant when the balloon went up, we already had the ideas in our knap sack. We had already discovered religion" ( 
Policy Sequencing
Second, the sequencing at work in the case of the macroprudential ideational shift was exactly the reverse of that evident in the case of UK macroeconomic policy in the 1970s.
There was no process of sustained prior policy experimentation with first and second order policy change from outside of the efficient markets perspective, with the exception of the odd isolated case 3 . Rather than a sequence of 1+2=3, the macroprudential shift, has involved a move straight to 3, prior to first and second order policy experimentation. The significance of this is that macroprudential policy is currently in a highly experimental phase of first and second order policy development, as countercyclical capital buffers and loan to value ratios and other policy instruments are developed and tested. As officials at the Bank of England note, "the state of macroprudential policy resembles the state of monetary policy just after the second world war, with patchy data, incomplete theory and negligible experience, meaning that MPR will be conducted by trial and error" (Aikman, Haldane, and Nelson, 2011) . This makes the macroprudential ideational shift a highly contingent one, but also an interesting test case for assessing whether a 3=2+1 sequence can be sustained without prior first and second order policy experimentation, or whether successful paradigm shifts always have to follow the 1+2=3 sequence first identified by Hall (Baker, 2013a) ..
23
For BIS officials involved in pioneering the conceptual frame of macroprudential regulation, a conceptual framework was first required to provide guidance for how policy instruments could be used (Correspondence with official, 12/02/12.) One reason for this reversed sequencing is that macroeconomic policy often requires forms of policy experimentation. The slow burning and non-dramatic nature of macroeconomic crises means that as in Hall's case, existing policy frameworks often gradually accumulate anomalies and cease to function as intended, necessitating, but also allowing the time and space for incremental and ad hoc experimentation. In contrast, financial regulation is directly concerned with financial markets, which can be volatile and conditions can change suddenly.
This means conceptual understandings of their functioning can break down much more quickly and also have to be revised much more hastily. In the pre-crash period, because regulators in leading financial centres like the US and UK were very content with the prevailing efficient markets light tough approach to financial regulation, it meant that advocates of an alternative view such as staff at the BIS, who wield influence through the provision of analysis, had to first develop conceptual work, outlining and further developing concepts such as procyclicality, as a rationale for the use of countercyclical policy instruments, if they were to ever stand a chance of persuading their client states and central banks to take macroprudential regulation seriously (Correspondence with the author, 12/02/02.).
Institutional and Political Context
Third, macroprudential ideational change was promoted by insider technocrats largely operating in established expert regulatory networks, which in the world of central banking and financial regulation have many of the features of transnational epistemic clan structures.
Central banking is increasingly comprised of 'knowledge communities' constructed around 24 inter-paradigmatic discussions about theory, methods, and data, as central banks'
organizational, territorial, and cultural boundaries blur with co-equal central bankers working closely together from project to project (Marcussen 2006, p. 10 ). G20 politicians did endorse the ideational shift, but they were not instrumental instigating it, as they were in the macroeconomic case of the 1970s. Third order macroprudential change was not a societal wide process. In Thurber's terms financial regulatory networks generally have the characteristics of policy subsystems, with low visibility, narrow scope for conflict, relatively low levels of conflict and a relatively small number of elite participants (Thurber, 1996, p.78) . The macroprudential ideational shift, as we have established did resemble a rapid shift in beliefs and values, -what Baumgartner and Jones have termed 'a dramatic change in policy image.' However, unlike their case of nuclear policy this was not the result of a simultaneous shift in policy venue (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991.) Instead, in the macroprudential case, the policy venue for promoting rapid change in the dominant financial regulatory policy image remained more or less constant, -a specialist series of international expert networks. These venues and established elites remained in the driving seat in forwarding regulatory proposals, because it was to these expert venues, politicians turned for guidance. There was however a significant reconfiguration in who was prominent in these networks, in the plausibility of their case and their persuasive capacity. The pattern with the macroprudential ideational shift was that a number of officials who had either been openly publicly critical of the prior orthodoxy, such as Borio and his BIS collegues, or had been privately critical but had felt unable to speak out in the prevailing climate, such as the Bank of England's financial stability team, became more prominent and vocal and found that the climate of opinion amongst politicians, the public at large and senior central bank policy makers within their own networks were much more receptive to their arguments (Baker, 2013a) . This process was accompanied by some evidence of reflexive learning by key pivotal Those such as Borio, who had publicly made arguments critical of the pre-crash orthodoxy, also experienced a rise in their levels of professional esteem, due to their prior performance in making some accurate calls and appearing prescient (Baker, 2013a , Baker 2014b The characteristics of the financial regulatory policy subsystem and the technical arcane nature of the subject matter, essentially allowed a coalition of public officials from central banks, related organizations and academic economists to change the dominant policy frame, relatively quickly and with little formal opposition. Macroprudential change agents were less dependent on building consensus, support and levels of understanding amongst wider societal and political actors, which macroeconomic policy's much higher political profile requires, although ultimately the technocratic nature of the macroprudential project may present long term legitimacy problems (Baker and Widamier, 2014) . Opposition to third order macroprudential regulatory philosophy has been relatively mute. For example, one might expect most opposition to come from the private sector and from large banks. Yet, the Institute for International Finance (IIF), part lobby group and part think tank for large North American and European Banks, has generally been supportive of a macroprudential approach to financial regulation, at least in broad conceptual terms (IIF, 2011) . Instead of contesting the broad philosophy behind macroprudential, the IIF has focused its attention on slowing and diluting first and second order policy change. The IIF has suggested that 'the science' in this area is at an early stage, while using capital as an instrument of macrostabilization was 'unprecedented and untested', requiring authorities to 'exercise great caution ' (IIF, 2011, p.22) . In national settings such as the UK, political parties and politicians, have not contested the need for macroprudential regulation, or its rationale, but bodies such as the Treasury Select Committee have taken a great interest in the operation of the new FPC and have sought to create mechanisms to call FPC policy makers to account, carving out an oversight role for themselves in the process. Ultimately, because first order policy settings and second policy instruments have implications for the day to day investment strategies and market operations of a variety of market actors, and the turf and standing of wider institutional and legislative actors, political contestation has been far more focused on appropriate first order policy settings and second order institutional policy arrangements, than on third order change. The result is a far more contested, contingent and even controversial sphere of first and second order macroprudential policy development, which of course may dilute macroprudential policy content, in substantive terms and stymie any potential paradigm shift (Baker, 2013b) .
Third order change without substantive first and second order policy movement would amount to little. Once again this is the reverse of the pattern in macroeconomic policy and both the differing nature of the crises and the different institutional and political characteristics of financial regulatory and macroeconomic policy systems as outlined here combine to provide reasons for that.
Macroeconomic Policy and the Financial Crash of 2008
In (Hodson and Mabbett, 2009, p.1058) .
In monetary policy, the turn to quantitative easing continues to reflect the limitations of conventional monetary policies under current circumstances, but it has not as yet entailed a jettisoning of the existing monetary policy framework (Hodson and Mabbett, 2009, p.1057 ).
More recently debate has begun about the use of nominal income or GDP targets as a guide for monetary policy (Bean, 2013 Fiscal policy too, is gradually becoming a more complex ideationally contested area. In the UK, after being critical of the coalition government's attempted deficit reduction strategy, based on a discourse of public spending 'crowding out' private investment, the current Labour opposition is now pledging to keep to the coalition's spending plans. Despite this move, the IMF has encouraged the UK government to slow down fiscal consolidation given low growth and prolonged stagnation in the 2008-13 period, pointing out that the UK has considerable fiscal policy space due to the length of debt maturities (Clift and Tomlinson, 2012) . In this sense, post crash, the IMF has adopted a much more pragmatic line on fiscal policy emphasising, context-dependent, contingent, and inherently transient historical constructs, rather than doctrinaire notions of fiscal consolidation (Clift and Tomlinson, 2012, p.16.) Greater emphasis has been placed by Fund analysis on fiscal policy as an important potential 'counter cyclical' tool (Blanchard et al, 2010) . The Fund has also argued that, 'those with room for fiscal policy manoeuvring, in terms of their fiscal accounts and credibility with markets, can reconsider the pace of consolidation ' (IMF 2012, p.21) . Nevertheless, despite the emergence of such alternative analyses and growing ideational contestation in the area of fiscal policy, the dominant pattern has been the emergence of a new era of austerity and a pattern of ideational stickiness drawing on notions of expansionary fiscal consolidations and Ricardian equivalence (Blyth, 2013 , Farrell and Quiggins, 2012 , Dellepiane Avellaneda, 2014 . Other scholars have suggested that sustained deflation in particular can create conditions ripe for elite persuasion strategies for significant macroeconomic policy change, again suggesting that the variety of crisis matter for the variety of ideational change we can expect to witness in policy making (Blyth, 2007) . Second, there was little evidence of a 1+2 sequence of anomaly accumulation and subsequent prolonged prior macroeconomic experimentation with first and second order policy decisions outside of the existing macroeconomic paradigm in the run up to 2008. More recently, it is conceivable that we have now entered a phase of 'technocratic inter-paradigm borrowing', as the old framework certainly in monetary policy has gradually become redundant and difficult to operate, and the evidence cited above suggests as much (Hay, 2011) . Third, largely because of the absence of the two prior 31 conditions there was no broad consensus on the failure of previous macroeconomic policy frameworks and only initial stirrings of political dissatisfaction with prior macroeconomic approaches. There was certainly no politically feasible, or immediately appealing and intellectual coherent alternative, with the exception of some short-term limited emergency
Keynesianism. Previous instances of significant macroeconomic ideational change, suggest macroeconomic discontent has to brew over time as problems and anomalies accumulate, alternative narratives and approaches are built, and processes of persuasion are embarked upon that results in some sort of politically viable consensus amongst the multiple actors that participate in the macro policy system of macroeconomic policy debate.
Conclusion
This article has argued that the interpretations of crisis that become dominant will partially be determined by the symptoms a particular crisis displays, as well as the institutional features of the policy system that have responsibility for particular areas of policy. As Reinhart and
Rogoff have identified, financial crises take many different forms. They identify seven types of crises covering: inflation crises; currency crashes; currency debasement; asset price bubbles bursting; banking crises; external debt crises; and domestic debt crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009 ). However, their classificatory schema is both mechanical and arbitrary, as they either rely on narrow quantitative measures, or equally narrowly defined events, to form their definitions. This not only obscures potential causal chains, and how crises can move around and flow into one another, but it also pays little attention to how crises come to be understood cognitively, and responded to, by a critical mass of societal and political actors, which in turn gives inter-subjective meaning to a crisis (Widmaier, Blyth and Seabrooke, 2007) . A true political economy of financial crises therefore needs to examine how ideas are used by policy 32 actors to interpret crises, but also how ideas in different policy domains change and respond to different forms of crisis in different ways. A more straight forward, simple distinction in terms of varieties of crisis, has been adopted here. A distinction has been drawn between explosive crises emanating from malfunctioning banking systems and private malinvestment, and slow burning crises of stagnation, declining living standards, falling wages and prices, or rising wages and prices, which involve a failure of government macroeconomic policies to meet stated targets, or objectives. These two forms of crisis can also obviously be connected and flow into one another, but they are unlikely to be interpreted in the same way, or to lead to the same patterns of ideational and institutional change.
In this respect, the existing literature has paid insufficient enough attention to how ideas interact with and respond to the material symptoms of crises, and how different policy sub systems can react and behave in different ways to different forms of crises. I have argued that the capacity for agents to affect change during periods of crisis is constrained by the type of crisis and its symptoms, as well as the institutional and political context that prevails in particular policy areas. The evidence presented here shows how different policy areas are subject to different political dynamics, different sequences and time frames, and become politically contentious in different ways. The paper has sought to demonstrate three specific differences between macroeconomic policy and financial regulation, drawing on Peter Hall's work, as illustrated in table 1. The paper has hypothesised that fundamental macroeconomic change requires the presence of three conditions: persistent macroeconomic failure and stagnation over a considerable 5-10 year period; prior policy experimentation from outside of the existing paradigm that reveals the inadequacies and anomalies of the existing policy framework; and growing political dissatisfaction with the existing paradigm, combined with the construction of an enabling coalition pushing a genuinely intellectually coherent and politically appealing alternative, which in the field of macroeconomic policy takes time to 33 assemble due to the presence of numerous potential veto players. In contrast financial regulation, as a policy subsystem behaves rather differently. Technical experts were able to act opportunistically and affect third order policy change and radically change the dominant policy frame and the assumptions on which it was based in a short period of time, with little signs of significant opposition. However, industry opposition and political contestation appears to be far more fierce in financial regulation over detail, than it is over broad parameters. Not only has third order change been quicker in the field of financial regulation, the sequencing that applies in macroeconomic policy has been reversed, while fights over the detail of policy appear far more contentious and contested than broad objectives. The explanation forwarded for this has emphasised that macroeconomic policy is more likely to respond to a slow burning crisis than dramatic banking crises, because this allows for complex causal chains to be interpreted and for political support for those interpretations to be built in diffuse macro policy systems. Time also allows for the policy experimentation to take place which further undermines an existing paradigm. In contrast, financial regulation has a policy system that can respond in a rapid and intellectually radically fashion to dramatic and explosive banking crises, but is then constrained by politically contested battles over points of detail. 
